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This study examines the role of women’s intra-household status relative to men in 
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This study examines the effect of women’s intra-household status relative to men upon 
children’s food security in Pakistan. Food security, defined as access to sufficient food 
for an active and healthy life, is pivotal to early childhood development. Children’s food 
security is, thus, a factor in economic growth since well-developed children are more 
productive as adults. Yet, malnutrition afflicts about a third of pre-school aged children 
in less developed countries. It is associated with over half of worldwide child mortality 
(Pelletier et al., 1995). South Asia has the world’s highest rate of child malnutrition, 
with 49.3 per cent of its 0 to 5 year old children underweight (Smith and Haddad 2000), 
this despite the fact that South Asia fares better than, e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa by a 
number of measures of economic development:. It has been argued that this—the so 
called South Asian Enigma—is due in part to the particularly low status of women in 
South Asia (e.g., Smith et al. 2004). Therefore, by examining the effect of women’s 
status upon children’s food security in a South Asian nation, namely, Pakistan, this 
paper hopes to contribute to a topical area of study in development economics. 
Inquiry into the effect of women’s intra-household status relative to children’s food 
security is also the means of testing between two competing views of households. While 
economists have traditionally considered the household a monolithic unit, this ‘unitary’ 
model has lately been yielding to the view that a household’s allocation decisions 
instead result from bargaining between its members. The unitary model, attributed to 
Becker (1965, 1981), typically assumes that, subject to a budget constraint, the 
household combines its labour with market inputs to produce a composite consumption 
good that is distributed among its members according to a single set of household 
preferences. It follows that improvement in women’s status may not affect intra-
household distribution. Collective models of intra-household allocation, on the other 
hand, often view intra-household distribution as the outcome of Nash Bargaining 
between members, so that allocations to a member (and her constituency) are dependent 
on her bargaining power. Thus, the models predict that improvement in women’s status 
shall increase allocations to women and children. It is necessary to test between these 
competing views of households since mistaken adherence to the unitary model may 
reduce the efficacy of policy (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997). For instance, 
public transfers to benefit children may be less effective if the particular adult recipient 
is not wholly solicitous about children. 
There is now much empirical support of bargaining models of intra-household 
allocation. For example, Schultz (1990) finds that a woman’s unearned income in 
Thailand has a more pronounced positive effect upon her fertility and consumption of 
leisure than the unearned income of her spouse, such income being taken to measure 
intra-household bargaining power. Similarly, Thomas (1990) discovers that family 
health outcomes in Brazil, such as child survival probabilities, are improved much more 
by increases in mothers’ than fathers’ unearned income. Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) 
find that an increase in the share of household income earned by women in Côte 
d’Ivoire raises the proportion of the household budget expended on food and reduces the 
budget shares of alcohol and cigarettes. Handa (1996) uncovers evidence from Jamaica 
that the presence in a household of a female decisionmaker generally increases the share 
of the household budget allocated to child and family goods. Lundberg, Pollak, and 
Wales (1997), in an examination of a late 1970s policy change in the UK that 
transferred a substantial child allowance to wives, find that this resulted in greater 
expenditures on women’s and children’s clothing relative to men’s clothing. Pitt and  
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Khandker (1998), in a study of microcredit programs in Bangladesh, determine that 
household consumption expenditure increased by 18 taka for every 100 taka borrowed 
by women, as opposed to an increase of only 11 taka for every 100 taka borrowed by 
men. Similarly, Levin, Ruel, and Morris (1999), in a study of urban households in 
Ghana, find that women allocate a larger share of their income towards meeting their 
children’s and their own basic needs despite earning less than men. Thomas, Contreras, 
and Frankenberg (2002) learn that child health in Java is influenced by the relative asset 
positions of parents at the time of their marriage, pre-marital assets being taken to 
measure intra-household bargaining power. In their examination of US data, Rubalcava 
and Thomas (2002) find that a woman’s options outside her marriage, as proxied by the 
generosity of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) benefits in her state of 
residence, appear to influence her bargaining power with consequences for intra-
household resource allocation. Lastly, using assets at the time of marriage as measures 
of bargaining power, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) reject the unitary model of the 
household in data from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa. 
It is clear, therefore, that tests of the unitary model against collective models of 
households have consisted of the investigation of links between, on the one hand, 
plausible measures of household members’ bargaining power and, on the other, either 
household demand for certain goods and services, such as health care and food, or the 
consequences thereof, such as children’s health outcomes. Quisumbing and Maluccio 
(2003) aptly note it is imperative that the tests employ exogenous measures of 
bargaining power. Accordingly, Hoddinott’s and Haddad’s (1995) measure of women’s 
bargaining power as the share of household income earned by women may not be 
suitable since earned or labour income reflects time allocation decisions that may be the 
outcomes of bargaining. In other words, the share of household income earned by 
women may be correlated with the unobserved aspects of bargaining power that make 
up part of the error term in a regression of household expenditure patterns against 
women’s income share. Other tests have adopted the intra-household distribution of 
unearned income (e.g., Schultz 1990), or of the ownership of inherited or pre-marital 
assets (e.g., Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 2002), as their measure of bargaining 
power. While it is more likely to be exogenous than earned income, unearned income 
too may be endogenous if it derives from assets accumulated by the means of earned 
income. Neither are inherited or pre-marital assets unambiguously exogenous. For 
instance, if parents follow the compensatory strategy of bequeathing more to less able 
children, and ability is correlated with post-marital bargaining power, inherited assets 
shall be endogenous. Marriage market selection poses difficulties as well. For example, 
a study that finds a positive relation between mother’s schooling and children’s 
educational outcomes would be wrong in concluding that this owes to the increased 
resources for children’s education being wrested from the household budget by means 
of the greater bargaining power of a more educated mother, if the children’s favourable 
educational outcomes are due instead to the father’s unobserved taste for educated 
children, the very taste that drove him to take an educated wife (Foster 2002). Only 
measures of bargaining power related to state supplied resources such as the child 
allowance in the UK investigated by Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) are likely to 
be unambiguously exogenous. Such natural experiments are, however, rare. This study 
must therefore adopt measures of the relative status of women that are not indisputably 
exogenous. 
Following Smith et al. (2004), the measures chosen are: an indicator of whether a 
woman is working for cash income, her age at first marriage, the per cent age difference  
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between a woman and her spouse, and the difference between their years of education. 
Following Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990), women’s intra-household status is in 
addition measured by the unearned income from remittances accruing to a household’s 
women. It is acceded that none of these five measures is unambiguously exogenous. A 
woman’s decision to work for cash income may, in fact, be the outcome of bargaining. 
A woman’s age at first marriage, the percent age difference between herself and her 
spouse, and the difference between their years of education may be endogenous because 
of marriage market selection. Income from remittances too might be endogenous if, for 
example, a neglected woman in an unequal marriage were more likely to receive 
material assistance from her natal family. 
Children’s food security is assessed by anthropometric measures of nutrition, as well as 
by means of the examination of household expenditures. Data from the 1991 Pakistan 
Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) yield a measure of evidence of a positive relation 
between women’s intra-household status and children’s food security. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section 4 presents the 
paper’s conclusions. 
2  Data and empirical methodology 
The study’s empirical analyses are performed upon data from the Pakistan Integrated 
Household Survey (PIHS), conducted by the World Bank and the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics of Pakistan in 1991 as part of the living standards measurement survey 
(LSMS) series of the Human Resources Division of the World Bank. The survey 
covered 4,800 households in 300 communities divided equally between rural and urban 
areas. The data are rich in personal, household, and community descriptors. These 
readily permit computation of the aforementioned measures of women’s intra-household 
status, namely, an indicator of whether a woman is working for cash income, her age at 
first marriage, the percent age difference between the woman and her spouse, the 
difference between their years of education, and the income from remittances received 
by a household’s women. 
In the parlance of bargaining models, a woman’s earned income is positively related to 
her reservation or threshold utility, i.e., to her options outside marriage. Hence, 
minimum resource allocations to her must increase in her earned income. Further, a 
woman who works outside her home may, from wider social contact, build extra-
familial support networks as well as become exposed to progressive norms of 
behaviour. She may thus turn more assertive at home. A woman’s age at first marriage 
is considered linked to her status since the earlier a woman marries, the less likely she is 
to complete schooling and embark upon an income earning career. Further, Pakistani 
women often enter a cloistered world upon marriage (the phrase ‘char divari’ or ‘four 
walls’ has been used to describe the circumscribed world of married women in Pakistan) 
and so it is conceivable that a woman who marries young will have had fewer 
opportunities to forge external support networks. The age difference between a woman  
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and her spouse too may be relevant to her bargaining power. It is likely that the larger1 
the age difference, the higher the woman’s status. Since it is plausible that a given age 
difference is less consequential the older the couple, the variable is calculated as the 
difference between the ages of a woman and her spouse expressed as a percentage of her 
spouse’s age. Similarly, since education pertains to earning capacity and, hence, to 
options outside marriage, it is likely that the larger the difference between the 
educational attainments of a woman and her spouse, the higher her status and bargaining 
power. Finally, unearned income from remittances accruing to a household’s women is 
considered related to their intra-household bargaining power. Since the income is 
unearned, it is less likely to be the outcome of bargaining than earned income, and as it 
is received by women, it is possible they have more control over its allocation. Kishor 
(2000) considers measures of women’s bargaining power to be of three types: those that 
give direct evidence of such power, such as an index of women’s participation in 
household decisionmaking; those that are sources of such power, such as employment 
and income; and those that characterize the setting or background of the power, such as 
the age and education differences between spouses. By this taxonomy, the first two and 
the fifth of this study’s measures of women’s status are ‘source’ indicators, whereas the 
third and fourth measures are ‘setting’ indicators. 
The empirical strategy is two-fold. First, the relation between women’s status and 
children’s food security is examined by the means of regressions of 0 to 5-year old 
children’s height-for-age, weight-for-height, and weight-for-age anthropometric 
nutritional Z-scores, against a variety of explanatory variables including measures of 
women’s status. The height-for-age Z-score, which measures ‘stunting’, is a gauge of 
children’s long-term nutritional status. The weight-for-height Z-score, which measures 
‘wasting’, is a gauge of children’s shorter-term nutritional status. The weight-for-age Z-
score, a combination of weight-for-height and height-for-age and the most common 
measure of children’s nutritional status, is used to assess if a child is underweight. The 
regression equations may be specified as: 
haz = α 1.Mawork + α 2. Agemar + α 3.Agediff + α 4.Educdiff + α5.Remitinc+ X’β1 + e1, (1) 
whz = γ 1.Mawork + γ 2. Agemar + γ 3.Agediff + γ 4.Educdiff + γ 5.Remitinc + X’β2 + e2, (2) 
and 
waz = δ 1.Mawork + δ 2. Agemar + δ 3.Agediff + δ 4.Educdiff + δ5 .Remitinc + X’β3 + e3, (3) 
where  haz,  whz, and waz  denote, respectively, a child’s height-for-age, weight-for-
height, and weight-for-age anthropometric Z-scores, Mawork is an indicator of whether 
the child’s mother worked for wages in the preceding twelve months or currently 
operates a household enterprise, Agemar is the mother’s age at first marriage, Agediff is 
the age difference between the mother and child’s father expressed as a percentage of 
the father’s age, Educdiff is the difference between their years of formal education, 
Remitinc is the sum of remittances received in the past 12 months by the women in the 
child’s household, X  is a vector of other plausible correlates of children’s 
anthropometric nutritional status, and ei , i = 1, 2, 3, the error terms, signify unobserved 
                                                 
1  Given that wives are typically younger than their husbands, ‘larger’ mostly translates as ‘less 
negative’  
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random influences. (1), (2), and (3) may be estimated by OLS. The finding that the 
estimated coefficients of the five measures of women’s status are positive and the 
variables significant would yield the conclusion that women’s bargaining power and 
children’s food security in Pakistan are positively related. Note, given that sampling in 
Living Standards Measurement Surveys is clustered, it is likely that multiple children 
are sampled from the very same cluster or village and, hence, probable that there is 
intra-cluster correlation in the regression errors, ei , i = 1, 2, 3. Adjustment of the OLS 
generated standard errors is, therefore, necessary. 
Next, household budgets are scrutinized to identify expenditure items that are plausibly 
related to children’s food security. It may be argued, for example, that since mainly 
children consume milk, household spending on milk is positively related to children’s 
food security. The difficulty, however, is that milk is not consumed exclusively by 
children. Indeed, it is near impossible to pick food items consumed solely by children in 
LDC household budgetary data. On the other hand, goods consumed solely by adults, 
such as tobacco, adult clothing, and adult footwear, are readily identified. Hence, why 
not draw inferences about children’s food security from budget shares devoted to adult 
goods?  Ceteris paribus, an increase in household budget shares devoted to goods 
consumed exclusively by adults ought to decrease children’s food security. This 
argument draws upon the logic employed by Deaton (1989) in his study of intra-
household gender discrimination. Hence, women’s status may be inferred to be 
positively related to children’s food security if improvement in women’s status causes 
reduction in household budget shares devoted to adult goods. This may be tested via the 
augmented Working-Leser specification for Engel curves, 
w = α + β.log(x/n) + γ.log n + λ1.(n04/n) + λ2.(n59/n) + λ3.(n1014/n)   (4) 
 +  μ1.Mawork + μ2. Agemar + μ3.Agediff + μ4.Educdiff + μ5.Remitinc + Z’π + u, 
estimable by OLS, where w is the share of a household’s budget devoted to the easily 
identified adult goods of tobacco, adult clothing, and adult footwear, x is total household 
expenditure, n is household size, n04, n59, and n1014 denote, respectively, the number 
of the household’s children in the age groups 0-4, 5-9, and 10-14, the first four measures 
of women’s status now pertain to the male household head’s spouse, Z is a vector of 
other plausible correlates of the share of the household’s budget devoted to adult goods, 
and u is the regression error. The finding that the estimated coefficients of the measures 
of women’s status are negative and the variables significant may be considered evidence 
of a positive relation between women’s status and children’s food security in Pakistan. 
Since Equations (1)–(3) are to be estimated upon data wherein the unit of observation is 
a child, whereas Equation (4) is to be estimated upon data wherein the unit of 
observation is a household, two separate samples, termed for the remainder of the paper 
as the ‘anthropometrics sample’ and the ‘adult goods sample’, are extracted from the 
PIHS. The anthropometrics sample consists of 3,718 children. Table 1 presents the 
sample mean values of the relevant variables. The adult goods sample consists of 3,745 
households. Table 2 presents the sample mean values of the pertinent variables. 
Approximately half of the children included in the anthropometrics sample are male. 
The average age among these 0-5 year olds is near 2 years and 4 months. About 54.8 per 
cent of the children are from rural households. Approximately 14.5 per cent of the 
children sampled have mothers who either worked for wages in the preceding 12  
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months or currently operate household enterprises. The average age at first marriage 
among mothers was about 17.5 years. On average, mothers have about 2.9 fewer years 
of schooling than fathers. Moreover, they are on average about 14.7 per cent younger 
than the children’s fathers. Average annual income from remittances per household is 
about 254.9 rupees of which about 88.4 rupees accrue to women. 
Slightly more than half of the households included in the adult goods sample are rural. 
On average, households in the sample spend about 7.4 per cent of their budgets upon the 
three adult goods of tobacco, adult clothing, and adult footwear. About 16 per cent of 
the wives2 of household heads either worked for wages in the preceding 12 months or 
currently operate household enterprises. The average age at first marriage among these 
 
Table 1 
Sample means: anthropometrics sample 
n = 3718 
Variable  Sample mean 
Dependent variables 
Height-for-age Z-score (haz) -1.87 
Weight-for-height Z-score (whz) -0.40 
Weight-for-age Z-score (waz) -1.37 
Child attributes 
Child is male  0.50 
Child’s age in years  2.26 
Father’s years of schooling  4.12 
Father’s age in years  35.61 
Mother’s age in years  29.83 
Household attributes 
Natural log of household per capita annual expenditure 
Actual household per capita annual expenditure in rupees (Rs.) 
8.15 
3463.38 
Natural log of household size 
Actual household size 
2.19 
8.94 
Household net worth in thousands of Rs.  227.76 
Remittances received in past 12 months by household in Rs.  254.95 
Household has no unshared source of drinking water  0.12 
Household has no drainage  0.86 
Household uses a community latrine  0.03 
Household has no garbage disposal  0.64 
Distance to closest medical facility in km  3.19 
Multi-generational household   0.53 
Rural household  0.55 
Resident of Punjab Province  0.52 
Resident of Sind Province  0.23 
Resident of NWF Province  0.18 
Key variables 
Child’s mother worked for cash income in past 12 months  0.15 
Age in years at first marriage of child’s mother  17.45 
Mother’s years of schooling less father’s years of schooling  -2.89 
Percent age difference between mother and father  -14.72 
Remittances received in past 12 months by household women in Rs.  88.42 
 
                                                 
2  In the event a household head has multiple wives, the eldest is considered the reference wife.  
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women was about 17.5 years. They have on average about 2.4 fewer years of schooling 
than their husbands. Further, they are on average about 14.3 per cent younger than their 
husbands. Average annual income from remittances per household is about 318.5 rupees 
of which about 128 rupees accrue to women. 
Table 2 
Sample means: adult goods sample 
n = 3745 
Variable  Sample mean 
Dependent variable 
Percentage of household budget expended upon adult goods  7.40 
Household attributes 
Natural log of household per capita annual expenditure 
Actual household per capita annual expenditure in rupees (Rs.) 
8.29 
3983.83 
Natural log of household size 
Actual household size 
1.94 
6.96 
Percentage of household in 0-4 age group  14.98 
Percentage of household in 5-9 age group  15.78 
Percentage of household in 10-14 age group  11.90 
Household head’s years of schooling  3.50 
Household head’s age in years  45.78 
Age in years of wife of household head  39.08 
Household net worth in thousands of rupees (Rs.)  232.27 
Remittances received in past 12 months by household in Rs.  318.52 
Multi-generational household   0.42 
Rural household  0.52 
Resident of Punjab Province  0.53 
Resident of Sind Province  0.27 
Resident of NWF Province  0.14 
Key variables 
Wife of household head worked for cash income in past 12 months  0.16 
Age in years at first marriage of wife of household head  17.50 
Difference in years of schooling between wife and household head  -2.43 
Percent age difference between wife and household head  -14.26 
Remittances received in past 12 months by household women in Rs.  128.04 
 
3  Empirical findings  
Table 3 presents estimates of Equations (1)-(3). Boys in Pakistan appear significantly 
less nourished than girls by the weight-for-age anthropometric nutritional measure,   
i.e., boys seem more likely to be underweight. This is consistent with the findings of, 
e.g., Das Gupta (1987), that the male-female calorie intake ratio was less than one in the 
0-1 age group in rural Punjab, India, and Walker and Ryan (1990), that more boys than 
girls of preschool (1-6) and school age (7-12) were poorly nourished on a standard of 
weight-for-age in six Southern Indian villages. Older children appear significantly less 
nourished by all three nutritional standards. Children’s nutrition by the height-for-age 
measure increases in paternal education. Nutrition by the height-for-age and weight-for-
age measures increases in household per capita annual expenditure. Since children’s 
anthropometric nutritional status depends not only upon the ingestion of nutrients but 
also upon household sanitation and the availability of health care, the regressors include 
measures of sanitation as well as the distance in kilometres to the nearest medical  
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facility. It appears households without their own latrine have less nourished children by 
the weight-for-height and weight-for-age standards. 
Table 3 
Determinants of 0-5 year old children’s anthropometric nutritional status: OLS estimates 
Dependent variables: height-for-age (haz), weight-for-height (whz), and weight-for-age (waz) Z-scores 


































































































































   Table  continues 
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Table 3 (con’t) 
Determinants of 0-5 year old children’s anthropometric nutritional status: OLS estimates 
Dependent variables: height-for-age (haz), weight-for-height (whz), and weight-for-age (waz) Z-scores 








































2 0.06  0.01  0.01 
n =  3718 
Note:   The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios using Huber-White robust standard errors. The 
superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Maternal status as measured by women’s earning of cash income is significantly 
positively related to children’s nutrition by the weight-for-height and weight-for-age 
standards. Maternal status as measured by the difference between the educational 
attainments of mother and father is significantly positively related to children’s nutrition 
by the height-for-age and weight-for-age standards. In sum, children’s long-term 
nutritional status as measured by the height-for-age standard significantly increases in 
the difference between the educational attainments of their mother and father, whereas 
their shorter-term nutritional status as measured by the weight-for-height standard 
significantly improves upon their mother working for cash income. Further, children are 
significantly less likely to be underweight the greater the difference between the 
educational attainments of their mother and father, and when their mother works for 
cash income. 
Table 4 presents estimates of Equation (4). The share of a household’s budget expended 
upon the three adult goods of tobacco, adult clothing, and adult footwear appears 
significantly positively related to the natural logs of household per capita annual 
expenditure and size. It is clear that the higher the proportion of a household’s members 
in the 0-14 age group, the lower its budget share devoted to adult goods. Given the 
co7sts of child rearing, an increase in the proportion of dependent children naturally 
reduces the share of resources expendable upon adult goods. The share of a household’s 
budget applied to adult goods decreases in the educational attainment of its head. 
Perhaps this is because a more educated household head is better aware of the critical 
role of resource allocations to children in human development. It appears wealthier 
households devote smaller proportions of their budgets to tobacco, adult clothing, and 
adult footwear as do rural households. Households in the Punjab and in the North West 
Frontier Province devote larger shares of their budgets to adult goods than do 




Determinants of household budgetary share expended upon adult goods: OLS estimates 
Dependent variable: percentage of household budget expended upon adult goods 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant  -52.77*** 
(-12.80) 
Household attributes 
Natural log of household per capita annual expenditure  6.43*** 
(13.65) 
Natural log of household size  4.05*** 
(6.75) 
Percentage of household in 0-4 age group  -0.03** 
(-2.00) 
Percentage of household in 5-9 age group  -0.03*** 
(-2.69) 
Percentage of household in 10-14 age group  -0.03** 
(-2.30) 
Household head’s years of schooling  -0.38*** 
(-4.86) 
Household head’s age in years  -0.22*** 
(-2.64) 
Age in years of wife of household head  0.18* 
(1.91) 
Household net worth in thousands of rupees (Rs.)  -0.001*** 
(-3.12) 
Remittances received in past 12 months by household in Rs.  0.00 
(0.50) 
Multi-generational household   -0.48 
(-1.01) 
Rural household  -1.10** 
(-2.31) 
Resident of Punjab Province  5.05*** 
(5.01) 
Resident of Sind Province  1.72 
(1.62) 
Resident of NWF Province  2.21* 
(1.88) 
Variable  Coefficient 
Key variables 
Wife of household head worked for cash income in past 12 months  2.16*** 
(4.63) 
Age in years at first marriage of wife of household head  -0.02 
(-0.36) 
Difference in years of schooling between wife and household head  -0.18** 
(-2.52) 
Percent age difference between wife and household head  -0.11** 
(-2.48) 





2  0.15 
n =   3745 
Note:  The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios using Huber-White robust standard errors. 
The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Women’s status as measured by the difference between the educational attainments of 
the wife and household head is significantly negatively related to the share of the 
household’s budget expended upon adult goods, as is women’s intra-household status as 
gauged by the percent age difference between wife and household head. As argued, this 
may be considered evidence of a positive relation between women’s status and 
allocations to children. Even the age at first marriage of a household head’s wife is 
negatively related to the share of the household’s budget applied to adult goods, though 
the variable is statistically insignificant. Curiously, the earning of cash income by a 
household head’s wife raises the share of the household’s budget applied to adult goods. 
Perhaps working women must increase spending on workplace attire and footwear. 
There is evidence,3 however, that more is spent on tobacco as well. Given that mainly 
men consume tobacco in Pakistan, perhaps working women have less than utter 
discretion over their earnings. In sum, two of the five measures of women’s status may 
be considered significantly positively correlated with resources allocated to children. 
Since the bulk of poor households’ resources is spent on food, it is likely that more 
resources allocated to children shall improve their food security. 
4 Conclusion 
This study aims to discover whether improvement in women’s intra-household status 
relative to men raises children’s food security in Pakistan, and, therefore, whether 
bargaining is the mechanism of intra-household resource allocation. Data from the 1991 
Pakistan Integrated Household Survey yield a measure of evidence of a link between 
women’s status and children’s food security. It is found that the more educated a child’s 
mother relative to her father, the better her long-term nutritional status as measured by 
the height-for-age standard. Further, the earning of cash income by mothers improves 
children’s shorter-term nutritional status as measured by the weight-for-height standard. 
Additionally, children’s weight-for-age anthropometric nutritional Z-scores increase in 
these two measures of mothers’ status. It is also found that women’s status as gauged by 
the difference between the educational attainments of his wife and household head, and 
the percent age difference between them, is significantly negatively related to the share 
of the household’s budget expended upon the three adult goods of tobacco, adult 
clothing, and adult footwear. This suggests that resources allocated to children and, by 
plausible implication, their food security increase in these two measures of women’s 
intra-household status. The paper’s findings of a positive relation between measures of 
women’s intra-household status and children’s food security may be taken to imply that 
households are not monolithic units but that bargaining is the mechanism of intra-
household allocation. 
                                                 
3 Available  upon  request  
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